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Abstract
We examine interacting cognitive modules of human biology
which, in the asymptotic limit of long sequences of responses,
define the output of an appropriate ‘dual’ information source.
Applying a ‘necessary condition’ communication theory for-
malism roughly similar to that of Dretske, but focused entirely
on long sequences of signals, we examine the regularities ap-
parent in comorbid psychiatric and chronic physical disorders
using an extension of recent perspectives on autoimmune dis-
ease. We find that structured psychosocial stress can literally
write a distorted image of itself onto child development, re-
sulting in a life course trajectory to characteristic forms of co-
morbid mind/body dysfunction affecting both dominant and
subordinate populations within a pathogenic social hierarchy.
Key words: American apartheid, anticomorbidity, chronic
disease, comorbidity, deindustrialization, developmental dis-
order, information theory, language of thought, mental disor-
der, punctuated equilibrium, schizophrenia
I. Introduction
Certain mental disorders, for example depression and sub-
stance abuse, and many physical conditions like lupus, coro-
nary heart disease, hypertension, breast and prostate cancers,
diabetes, obesity, and asthma, show marked regularities at
the community level of organization according to the social
constructs of ‘race’, ‘gender’, ‘ethnicity’, and ‘socioeconomic
status’. Indeed, a virtual research industry has emerged in the
United States to address the ‘mystery’ of such ‘health dispar-
ities’. Population-level structure in disease permits profound
insight into etiology because, to the extent these are ‘envi-
ronmental’ disorders, the principal environment of humans is
other humans, moderated by a uniquely characteristic embed-
ding cultural context (e.g. Durham, 1991). Thus culturally-
sculpted ‘social exposures’ are likely to be important at the
individual, and critical at the population, levels of organi-
zation in the expression of certain mental disorders and a
plethora of chronic diseases.
Further, mental disorders are often comorbidly expressed,
both among themselves and with certain kinds of chronic
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physical disorder: Picture the obese, diabetic, depressed, anx-
ious patient suffering from high blood pressure, asthma, coro-
nary heart disease, and so on. Such comorbidity is the rule
rather than the exception for the seriously ill, and is the cen-
tral focus of this work. We will also examine how certain
disorders may, in fact, be ‘anticomorbid’.
Co- and antico- morbidity may indeed prove to be, for both
medicine and public health, the kind of ‘dirty open secret’
that punctuation in the fossil record has proven to be for evo-
lutionary theory (e.g. Gould, 2002; Eldredge, 1985). Just
as open address of ‘regular irregularities’ in the fossil record
has led to great advances in evolutionary thinking, more for-
mal exploration of comorbidity may prove strikingly useful to
contemporary medical and public health thinking.
As Cohen (2000) describes for autoimmune disease, how-
ever, the appearance of co- and antico- morbid conditions is,
given the possibilities, rather surprisingly constrained to a rel-
atively few often-recurring patterns. We will find this to be a
central point.
Here we study how a long list of ‘cognitive submodules’
may become synergistically linked with embedding, culturally
structured, psychosocial stress to produce comorbid patterns
of illness associated with mental disorder and chronic disease.
We will further suggest that many such disorders either have
their roots in utero, as a stressed mother communicates envi-
ronmental signals across the placenta, and programs her de-
veloping child’s physiology, or else are initiated during early
childhood. This pattern may affect underlying susceptibility
to chronic infections or parasitic infestation as well as more
‘systemic’ disorders (e.g. Wallace and Wallace, 2002).
We are, then, particularly interested in the effects of ‘stress’
on the interaction between mind and body over the life course.
‘Stress’, we aver, is not often random in human societies, but
is often itself a socially constructed cultural artifact, a very
highly organized, ‘language’, having both a grammar and a
syntax, so that certain stressors are ‘meaningful’ in a particu-
lar developmental context, and others are not, having little or
no long-term physiological effect. We first argue that ratio-
nal thought, emotion, immune function, related physiological
processes like the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis,
blood pressure regulation, and sociocultural network function
are, in fact, formally, if often weakly, cognitive systems. Each
is associated with a ‘dual information source’ which may also
be expressed as a kind of language. It is the punctuated in-
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terpenetration of these ‘languages’ which we will find critical
to an understanding of how structured psychosocial stress af-
fects the mind-body interaction, and, ultimately, writes a lit-
eral image of that structure upon that interaction, beginning
in utero or early childhood, and determining a trajectory to
inherently comorbid disease.
We begin with a recitation of some formally cognitive sub-
modules of human biology, in a large sense, which we believe
interact both with each other and with structured psychoso-
cial stress. Next we explore cognition as ‘language’, and infer
the existence of a ‘generalized cognitive homunculus’ analo-
gous to that explored by Cohen (2000) as the basis of au-
toimmune disease. Ultimately we propose a model based on
autoimmune disease to account for a life trajectory of chronic
comorbid psychiatric/physical disorder as involving a usually
transient excited state of that homunculus which becomes a
pathologically and recurrently ‘permanent’ zero-mode.
Although perhaps not falling strictly within our princi-
pal focus on the outcomes of structured psychosocial stress,
schizophrenia seems amenable to an extension of our ap-
proach, most probably in a ‘second order’ manner, involving
distortion of the spectrum of co- and antico- morbidities asso-
ciated with the disorder. Fuller exploration of such a second
order extension will be carried out in a subsequent work.
Some further comment on our methodology is appropriate.
We adapt recent advances in understanding ‘punctuated
equilibrium’ in evolutionary process (e.g. Wallace, 2002b;
Wallace and Wallace, 1998, 1999; Wallace et al., 2003) to
the question of how embedding structured psychosocial stress
affects the interaction of ‘mind’ and ‘body’, and specifically
seek to determine how the synergism of such stress with cog-
nitive submodule function might be constrained by certain of
the asymptotic limit theorems of probability.
We know that, regardless of the probability distribution of
a particular stochastic variate, the Central Limit Theorem en-
sures that long sums of independent realizations of that vari-
ate will follow a Normal distribution. Analogous constraints
exist on the behavior of the ‘information sources’ we will find
associated with both structured stress and cognitive module
function – both independent and interacting – and these are
described by the limit theorems of information theory. Impo-
sition of phase transition formalism from statistical physics, in
the spirit of the Large Deviations Program of applied proba-
bility, permits concise and unified description of evolutionary
and cognitive ‘learning plateaus’ which, in the evolutionary
case, are interpreted as evolutionary punctuation (e.g. Wal-
lace, 2002a, b). This approach provides a ‘natural’ means
of exploring punctuated processes in the effects of structured
stress on mind-body interaction.
The model, as in the relation of the Central Limit The-
orem to parametric statistical inference, is almost indepen-
dent of the detailed structure of the interacting information
sources inevitably associated with cognitive process, impor-
tant as such structure may be in other contexts. This finesses
some of the profound ambiguities associated with ‘dynamic
systems theory’ and ‘deterministic chaos’ treatments in which
the existence of ‘dynamic attractors’ depends on very specific
kinds of differential equation models akin to those used to de-
scribe ecological population dynamics, chemical processes, or
physical systems of weights-on-springs. Cognitive phenomena
are neither well-stirred Erlenmeyer flasks of reacting agents,
nor distorted mechanical clocks, and the application of ‘non-
linear dynamic systems theory’ to cognition will likely be
found to involve little more than hopeful metaphor. Indeed,
much of contemporary nonlinear dynamics can be subsumed
within our formalism through ‘symbolic dynamics’ discretiza-
tion techniques (e.g. Beck and Schlogl, 1995).
Rather than taking symbolic dynamics as an approximation
to ‘more exact’ nonlinear ordinary or stochastic differential
equation models, we throw out, as it were, the Cheshire cat
and keep the cat’s smile, generalizing symbolic dynamics to a
more comprehensive information dynamics not constrained by
18th Century ghosts trapped in noisy, nonlinear, mechanical
devices.
Our approach is conditioned, somewhat, by Wadding-
ton’s (1972) vision that, in situations which arise when
there is mutual interaction between the complexity-out-of-
simplicity (self-assembly), and simplicity-out-of-complexity
(self-organization), processes are to be discussed most pro-
foundly with the help of the analogy of language, i.e. that
language may become a paradigm go a Theory of General Bi-
ology, but a language in which basic sentences are programs,
not statements.
In contrast to nonlinear systems theory approaches in which
it appears impossible to actually write down the assumed un-
derlying ‘basic nonlinear equations’ of cognitive phenomena,
it does seem possible to uncover the grammar and syntax of
both structured psychosocial stress and the function of cog-
nitive submodules, and to express their relations in terms of
empirically observed regression models relating measurable
biomarkers, behaviors, beliefs, feelings, and so on.
Our analysis will focus on the eigenstructure of those mod-
els, constrained by the behavior of information sources under
appropriate asymptotic limit theorems of probability.
Clearly, then, our approach takes much from parametric
statistics, and, while idiosyncratic ‘nonparametric’ models
may be required in special cases, we may well capture the
essence of the most common relevant phenomena.
What we attempt is, in fact, surprisingly consonant with
a current of mainstream thinking in cognitive science, what
Adams (2003) characterizes as “the informational turn in phi-
losophy”, i.e. the relatively recent application of information-
theoretic perspectives to the long, arduous, intellectual quest
to understand ‘mind’. One of the first reasonably successful
syntheses was that of Dretske (1981, 1988, 1992, 1993, 1994),
who put the matter thus (Dretske, 1994):
“The mind can be viewed as an information-
driven control system. To make this work, the idea
of information must be operationalized in such a
way as to give semantic properties (meaning, con-
tent) a role in the explanation of system behavior.
This can be achieved by exploiting a statistical con-
cept – mutual information – from communication
theory. On this interpretation, some of the behav-
ior of information-driven control systems is causally
explained by the statistical correlations that exist
between internal states and the external conditions
about which they carry information...
[A]lthough the chief concern of communication
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theory is the statistical properties of signals and
channels, not the semantic information (if any) that
these signals happen to carry over the channels, the
statistical properties turn out to be relevant to what
semantic information a signal can carry. Unless
there is a statistically reliable channel of communica-
tion between [source] S and [receiver] R, the signals
reaching R from S cannot indicate what is happen-
ing at S... No signal can carry semantic informa-
tion... unless the channel over which the signal ar-
rives satisfies the appropriate statistical constraints
of communication theory...
Communication theory can be interpreted as
telling one something important about the condi-
tions that are needed for the transmission of infor-
mation as ordinarily understood, about what it takes
for the transmission of semantic information. This
has tempted people... to exploit [information the-
ory] in semantic and cognitive studies, and thus, in
the philosophy of mind...
If a semantic engine is a system whose per-
formance is explained, not simply by the physical
events occurring in it, but by the meaning of infor-
mation that these events carry, then some systems,
those capable of [learning], are semantic engines.
The control system in such engines is an information-
driven control system. Such systems are, in this
sense and to this extent, minded”
That is, at very least, information theory explores the nec-
essary conditions for cognitive process.
As Adams (2003) discusses in some detail, however, Dretske
became particularly interested in questions regarding the in-
formation carried by a single symbol, i.e. the challenge of
uniting the mathematical theory of information with a se-
mantics:
“It is not uncommon to think that information
is a commodity generated by things with minds.
Let’s say that a naturalized account puts matters
the other way around, viz. it says that minds are
things that come into being by purely natural causal
means of exploiting the information in their envi-
ronments. This is the approach taken by Dretske as
he tried consciously to unite the cognitive sciences
around the well-understood mathematical theory of
communication...
[N]early everyone realized that information and
mathematical properties of informational amounts
and their transmission were not the same thing as
semantic content or meaning... Dretske’s insight was
to see clearly (more clearly than most) what needed
to be done to accomplish this.”
Here we will finesse the problem by redirecting attention
from the informational content or ‘meaning’ of individual
symbols, i.e. the province of semantics, back to the statis-
tical properties of long trains of symbols emitted by an ‘in-
formation source’. As Dretske so clearly saw, this allows us
to conduct scientific inference on the necessary conditions for
cognitive process, but now in the asymptotic limit of very long
sequences of output, which is quite precisely the home ground
of classic communication theory. This redirection, we claim,
will provide, along with some further modest asymptotic ma-
chinery imported from statistical physics, a sufficient basis for
understanding the role of structured psychosocial stress in the
etiology of developmental cognitive disorder, in a large sense.
II. Some cognitive modules of human biology
1. Immune function Atlan and Cohen (1998) have pro-
posed an information-theoretic cognitive model of immune
function and process, a paradigm incorporating cognitive pat-
tern recognition-and-response behaviors analogous to those of
the central nervous system. This work follows in a very long
tradition of speculation on the cognitive properties of the im-
mune system (e.g. Tauber, 1998; Podolsky and Tauber, 1998;
Grossman, 1989, 1992, 1993a, b, 2000).
From the Atlan/Cohen perspective, the meaning of an anti-
gen can be reduced to the type of response the antigen gen-
erates. That is, the meaning of an antigen is functionally
defined by the response of the immune system. The mean-
ing of an antigen to the system is discernible in the type of
immune response produced, not merely whether or not the
antigen is perceived by the receptor repertoire. Because the
meaning is defined by the type of response there is indeed a
response repertoire and not only a receptor repertoire.
To account for immune interpretation Cohen (1992, 2000)
has reformulated the cognitive paradigm for the immune sys-
tem. The immune system can respond to a given antigen in
various ways, it has ‘options.’ Thus the particular response
we observe is the outcome of internal processes of weighing
and integrating information about the antigen.
In contrast to Burnet’s view of the immune response as a
simple reflex, it is seen to exercise cognition by the interpola-
tion of a level of information processing between the antigen
stimulus and the immune response. A cognitive immune sys-
tem organizes the information borne by the antigen stimulus
within a given context and creates a format suitable for in-
ternal processing; the antigen and its context are transcribed
internally into the ‘chemical language’ of the immune system.
The cognitive paradigm suggests a language metaphor to
describe immune communication by a string of chemical sig-
nals. This metaphor is apt because the human and immune
languages can be seen to manifest several similarities such as
syntax and abstraction. Syntax, for example, enhances both
linguistic and immune meaning.
Although individual words and even letters can have their
own meanings, an unconnected subject or an unconnected
predicate will tend to mean less than does the sentence gen-
erated by their connection.
The immune system creates a ‘language’ by linking two
ontogenetically different classes of molecules in a syntactical
fashion. One class of molecules are the T and B cell recep-
tors for antigens. These molecules are not inherited, but are
somatically generated in each individual. The other class of
molecules responsible for internal information processing is
encoded in the individual’s germline.
Meaning, the chosen type of immune response, is the out-
come of the concrete connection between the antigen subject
and the germline predicate signals.
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The transcription of the antigens into processed peptides
embedded in a context of germline ancillary signals consti-
tutes the functional ‘language’ of the immune system. De-
spite the logic of clonal selection, the immune system does
not respond to antigens as they are, but to abstractions of
antigens-in-context.
2. Tumor control We propose that the next cognitive
submodule after the immune system is a tumor control mech-
anism which may include ‘immune surveillance’, but clearly
transcends it. Nunney (1999) has explored cancer occurrence
as a function of animal size, suggesting that in larger ani-
mals, whose lifespan grows as about the 4/10 power of their
cell count, prevention of cancer in rapidly proliferating tissues
becomes more difficult in proportion to size. Cancer control
requires the development of additional mechanisms and sys-
tems to address tumorigenesis as body size increases – a syn-
ergistic effect of cell number and organism longevity. Nunney
concludes
“This pattern may represent a real barrier to the
evolution of large, long-lived animals and predicts
that those that do evolve ... have recruited addi-
tional controls [over those of smaller animals] to pre-
vent cancer.”
Different tissues may have evolved markedly different tu-
mor control strategies. All of these, however, are likely to
be energetically expensive, permeated with different complex
signaling strategies, and subject to a multiplicity of reactions
to signals, including those related to psychosocial stress. For-
lenza and Baum (2000) explore the effects of stress on the
full spectrum of tumor control, ranging from DNA damage
and control, to apoptosis, immune surveillance, and mutation
rate. Elsewhere (R. Wallace et al., 2003) we argue that this
elaborate tumor control strategy, particularly in large ani-
mals, must be at least as cognitive as the immune system
itself, which is one of its components: some comparison must
be made with an internal picture of a ‘healthy’ cell, and a
choice made as to response: none, attempt DNA repair, trig-
ger programmed cell death, engage in full-blown immune at-
tack. This is, from the Atlan/Cohen perspective, the essence
of cognition.
3. The HPA axis The hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal
(HPA) axis, the ‘flight-or-fight’ system, is clearly cognitive in
the Atlan/Cohen sense. Upon recognition of a new pertur-
bation in the surrounding environment, memory and brain
or emotional cognition evaluate and choose from several pos-
sible responses: no action needed, flight, fight, helplessness
(i.e. flight or fight needed, but not possible). Upon appro-
priate conditioning, the HPA axis is able to accelerate the
decision process, much as the immune system has a more effi-
cient response to second pathogenic challenge once the initial
infection has become encoded in immune memory. Certainly
‘hyperreactivity’ in the context of post-traumatic stress dis-
order (PTSD) is a well known example. Chronic HPA axis
activation is deeply implicated in visceral obesity leading to
diabetes and heart disease, via the leptin/cortisol diurnal cy-
cle (e.g. Bjorntorp, 2001).
4. Blood pressure regulation Rau and Elbert (2001)
review much of the literature on blood pressure regulation,
particularly the interaction between baroreceptor activation
and central nervous function. We paraphrase something of
their analysis. The essential point, of course, is that unreg-
ulated blood pressure would be quickly fatal in any animal
with a circulatory system, a matter as physiologically fun-
damental as tumor control. Much work over the years has
elucidated some of the mechanisms involved: increase in arte-
rial blood pressure stimulates the arterial baroreceptors which
in turn elicit the baroreceptor reflex, causing a reduction in
cardiac output and in peripheral resistance, returning pres-
sure to its original level. The reflex, however, is not actually
this simple: it may be inhibited through peripheral processes,
for example under conditions of high metabolic demand. In
addition, higher brain structures modulate this reflex arc, for
instance when threat is detected and fight or flight responses
are being prepared. This suggests, then, that blood pressure
control cannot be a simple reflex, but is, rather, a broad and
actively cognitive modular system which compares a set of in-
coming signals with an internal reference configuration, and
then chooses an appropriate physiological level of blood pres-
sure from a large repertory of possible levels, i.e. a cognitive
process in the Atlan/Cohen sense. The baroreceptors and the
baroreceptor reflex are, from this perspective, only one set of
a complex array of components making up a larger and more
comprehensive cognitive blood pressure regulatory module.
5. Emotion Thayer and Lane (2000) summarize the case
for what can be described as a cognitive emotional process.
Emotions, in their view, are an integrative index of individual
adjustment to changing environmental demands, an organis-
mal response to an environmental event that allows rapid mo-
bilization of multiple subsystems. Emotions are the moment-
to-moment output of a continuous sequence of behavior, orga-
nized around biologically important functions. These ‘lawful’
sequences have been termed ‘behavioral systems’ by Timber-
lake (1994).
Emotions are self-regulatory responses that allow the effi-
cient coordination of the organism for goal-directed behavior.
Specific emotions imply specific eliciting stimuli, specific ac-
tion tendencies including selective attention to relevant stim-
uli, and specific reinforcers. When the system works properly,
it allows for flexible adaptation of the organism to changing
environmental demands, so that an emotional response repre-
sents a selection of an appropriate response and the inhibition
of other less appropriate responses from a more or less broad
behavioral repertoire of possible responses. Such ‘choice’, we
will show, leads directly to something closely analogous to the
Atlan and Cohen language metaphor.
Damasio (1998) concludes that emotion is the most complex
expression of homeostatic regulatory systems. The results of
emotion serve the purpose of survival even in nonminded or-
ganisms, operating along dimensions of approach or aversion,
of appetition or withdrawal. Emotions protect the subject
organism by avoiding predators or scaring them away, or by
leading the organism to food and sex. Emotions often op-
erate as a basic mechanism for making decisions without the
labors of reason, that is, without resorting to deliberated con-
siderations of facts, options, outcomes, and rules of logic. In
humans learning can pair emotion with facts which describe
the premises of a situation, the option taken relative to solv-
ing the problems inherent in a situation, and perhaps most
importantly, the outcomes of choosing a certain option, both
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immediately and in the future. The pairing of emotion and
fact remains in memory in such a way that when the facts are
considered in deliberate reasoning when a similar situation is
revisited, the paired emotion or some aspect of it can be re-
activated. The recall, according to Damasio, allows emotion
to exert its pairwise qualification effect, either as a conscious
signal or as nonconscious bias, or both, In both types of ac-
tion the emotions and the machinery underlying them play
an important regulatory role in the life of the organism. This
higher order role for emotion is still related to the needs of
survival, albeit less apparently.
Thayer and Friedman (2002) argue, from a dynamic sys-
tems perspective, that failure of what they term ‘inhibitory
processes’ which, among other things, direct emotional re-
sponses to environmental signals, is an important aspect of
psychological and other disorder. Sensitization and inhibi-
tion, they claim, ‘sculpt’ the behavior of an organism to meet
changing environmental demands. When these inhibitory pro-
cesses are dysfunctional – choice fails – pathology appears at
numerous levels of system function, from the cellular to the
cognitive.
Thayer and Lane (2000) also take a dynamic systems per-
spective on emotion and behavioral subsystems which, in the
service of goal-directed behavior and in the context of a be-
havioral system, they see organized into coordinated assem-
blages that can be described by a small number of control
parameters, like the factors of factor analysis, revealing the
latent structure among a set of questionnaire items thereby
reducing or mapping the higher dimensional item space into a
lower dimensional factor space. In their view, emotions may
represent preferred configurations in a larger ‘state-space’ of
a possible behavioral repertoire of the organism. From their
perspective, disorders of affect represent a condition in which
the individual is unable to select the appropriate response,
or to inhibit the inappropriate response, so that the response
selection mechanism is somehow corrupted.
Gilbert (2001) suggests that a canonical form of such ‘cor-
ruption’ is the excitation of modes that, in other circum-
stances, represent ‘normal’ evolutionary adaptations, a mat-
ter to which we will return at some length below.
6. ‘Rational thought’ Although a Cartesian dichotomy
between ‘rational thought’ and ‘emotion’ may be increasingly
suspect, nonetheless humans, like many other animals, do in-
deed conduct individual rational cognitive decision-making as
most of us would commonly understand it. Various forms
of dementia involve characteristic patterns of degradation in
that ability.
7. Sociocultural networkHumans are particularly noted
for a hypersociality which inevitably enmeshes us all in group
processes of decision, i.e. collective cognitive behavior within
a social network, tinged by an embedding shared culture. For
humans, culture is truly fundamental. Durham (1991) argues
that genes and culture are two distinct but interacting systems
of inheritance within human populations. Information of both
kinds has influence, actual or potential, over behaviors, which
creates a real and unambiguous symmetry between genes and
phenotypes on the one hand, and culture and phenotypes,
on the other. Genes and culture are best represented as two
parallel lines or tracks of hereditary influence on phenotypes.
Much of hominid evolution can be characterized as an in-
terweaving of genetic and cultural systems. Genes came to
encode for increasing hypersociality, learning, and language
skills. The most successful populations displayed increasingly
complex structures that better aided in buffering the local
environment (e.g. Bonner, 1980).
Successful human populations seem to have a core of tool
usage, sophisticated language, oral tradition, mythology, mu-
sic, and decision making skills focused on relatively small fam-
ily/extended family social network groupings. More complex
social structures are built on the periphery of this basic ob-
ject (e.g. Richerson and Boyd, 1995). The human species’
very identity may rest on its unique evolved capacities for
social mediation and cultural transmission. These are par-
ticularly expressed through the cognitive decision making of
small groups facing changing patterns of threat and opportu-
nity, processes in which we are all embedded and all partici-
pate.
III. Cognition as ‘language’
Atlan and Cohen (1998) argue that the essence of cognition
is comparison of a perceived external signal with an internal,
learned picture of the world, and then, upon that comparison,
the choice of one response from a much larger repertoire of
possible responses. We make a very general model of this
process.
Pattern recognition-and-response, as we characterize it,
proceeds by convoluting an incoming external ‘sensory’ sig-
nal with an internal ‘ongoing activity’ – the ‘learned picture
of the world’ – and, at some point, triggering an appropri-
ate action based on a decision that the pattern of sensory
activity requires a response. We need not specify how the
pattern recognition system is ‘trained’, and hence we adopt
a weak model, regardless of learning paradigm, which can
itself be more formally described by the Rate Distortion The-
orem. We will, fulfilling Atlan and Cohen’s (1998) criterion of
meaning-from-response, define a language’s contextual mean-
ing entirely in terms of system output.
The model, an extension of that presented in Wallace
(2000), is as follows.
A pattern of ‘sensory’ input, say an ordered sequence
y0, y1, ..., is mixed in a systematic way with internal ‘ongoing’
activity, the sequence w0, w1, ..., to create a path of compos-
ite signals x = a0, a1, ..., an, ..., where aj = f(yj , wj) for a
function f . An explicit example will be given below. This
path is then fed into a highly nonlinear ‘decision oscillator’
which generates an output h(x) that is an element of one of
two (presumably) disjoint sets B0 and B1. We take
B0 ≡ b0, ..., bk,
B1 ≡ bk+1, ..., bm.
Thus we permit a graded response, supposing that if
h(x) ∈ B0
the pattern is not recognized, and if
h(x) ∈ B1
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the pattern is recognized and some action bj , k+1 ≤ j ≤ m
takes place.
We are interested in composite paths x which trigger pat-
tern recognition-and-response exactly once. That is, given a
fixed initial state a0, such that h(a0) ∈ B0, we examine all
possible subsequent paths x beginning with a0 and leading
exactly once to the event h(x) ∈ B1. Thus h(a0, ..., aj) ∈ B0
for all j < m, but h(a0, ..., am) ∈ B1.
For each positive integer n let N(n) be the number of
paths of length n which begin with some particular a0 having
h(a0) ∈ B0 and lead to the condition h(x) ∈ B1. We shall
call such paths ‘meaningful’ and assume N(n) to be consid-
erably less than the number of all possible paths of length n
– pattern recognition-and-response is comparatively rare. We
further assume that the finite limit
H ≡ lim
n→∞
log[N(n)]
n
both exists and is independent of the path x. We will – not
surprisingly – call such a cognitive process ergodic.
Note that disjoint partition of ‘state space’ may be pos-
sible according to sets of states which can be connected by
‘meaningful’ paths, leading to a ‘natural’ coset algebra of the
system, a matter of some importance we will not pursue here.
We may thus define an ergodic information sourceX associ-
ated with stochastic variates Xj having joint and conditional
probabilities P (a0, ..., an) and P (an|a0, ..., an−1) such that ap-
propriate joint and conditional Shannon uncertainties may be
defined which satisfy the relations (Cover and Thomas, 1991;
Ash, 1990)
H[X] = lim
n→∞
log[N(n)]
n
=
lim
n→∞H(Xn|X0, ..., Xn−1) =
lim
n→∞
H(X0, ..., Xn)
n
.
(1)
We say this information source is dual to the ergodic cog-
nitive process.
The Shannon-McMillan Theorem provides a kind of ‘law of
large numbers’ and permits definition of the Shannon uncer-
tainties in terms of cross-sectional sums of the form
H = −
∑
Pk log[Pk],
where the Pk are taken from a probability distribution, so
that
∑
Pk = 1. Again, Cover and Thomas (1991) or Ash
(1990) provide algebraic details.
It is important to recognize that different ‘languages’ will be
defined by different divisions of the total universe of possible
responses into various pairs of sets B0 and B1, or by requiring
more than one response in B1 along a path. Like the use of
different distortion measures in the Rate Distortion Theorem
(e.g. Cover and Thomas, 1991), however, it seems obvious
that the underlying dynamics will all be qualitatively similar.
Nonetheless, dividing the full set of possible responses into
the sets B0 and B1 may itself require ‘higher order’ cognitive
decisions by another module or modules, suggesting the ne-
cessity of ‘choice’ within a more or less broad set of possible
‘languages of thought’. This would directly reflect the need to
‘shift gears’ according to the different challenges faced by the
organism, either cross-sectionally at a particular time, or de-
velopmentally as it matures, accounting for ‘critical periods’
in the onset of developmental disorder, a matter to which
we will return. A critical problem then becomes the choice
of a ‘normal’ zero-mode language among a very large set of
possible languages representing the (hyper- or hypo-) ‘excited
states’ accessible to the system. This is a fundamental point
which we explore below in various ways.
In sum, meaningful paths – creating an inherent grammar
and syntax – have been defined entirely in terms of system
response, as Atlan and Cohen (1998) propose.
We can apply this formalism to the stochastic neuron in
a neural network: A series of inputs yji , i = 1, ...m from m
nearby neurons at time j to the neuron of interest is convo-
luted with ‘weights’ wji , i = 1, ...,m, using an inner product
aj = yj ·wj ≡
m∑
i=1
yjiw
j
i
(2)
in the context of a ‘transfer function’ f(yj ·wj) such that the
probability of the neuron firing and having a discrete output
zj = 1 is P (zj = 1) = f(yj ·wj).
Thus the probability that the neuron does not fire at time
j is just 1 − P . In the usual terminology the m values yji
constitute the ‘sensory activity’ and the m weights wji the
‘ongoing activity’ at time j, with aj = yj ·wj and the path
x ≡ a0, a1, ..., an, .... A more elaborate example is given in
Wallace (2002a).
A little work leads to a standard neural network model
in which the network is trained by appropriately varying w
through least squares or other error minimization feedback.
This can be shown to replicate rate distortion arguments, as
we can use the error definition to define a distortion function
which measures the difference between the training pattern
y and the network output yˆ as a function, for example, of
the inverse number of training cycles, K. As we will discuss
in another context, ‘learning plateau’ behavior emerges natu-
rally as a phase transition in the mutual information I(Y, Yˆ )
driven by the parameter K.
Thus we will eventually parametize the information source
uncertainty of the dual information source to a cognitive pat-
tern recognition-and-response with respect to one or more
variates, writing, e.g. H[K], where K ≡ (K1, ...,Ks) repre-
sents a vector in a parameter space. Let the vector K follow
some path in time, i.e. trace out a generalized line or surface
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K(t). We will, following the argument of Wallace (2002b),
assume that the probabilities defining H, for the most part,
closely track changes inK(t), so that along a particular ‘piece’
of a path in parameter space the information source remains
as close to memoryless and ergodic as is needed for the math-
ematics to work. Between pieces we impose phase transition
characterized by a renormalization symmetry, in the sense of
Wilson (1971). See Binney, et al. (1986) for a more com-
plete discussion. Wallace et al. (2003) and R. Wallace and
R.G. Wallace (2003) present detailed calculations of ‘biolog-
ical’ renormalizations and ‘universality class tuning’ which
take the theory well beyond simple physical analogs.
We will call such an information source ‘adiabatically piece-
wise memoryless ergodic’ (APME). The ergodic nature of the
information sources is a generalization of the ‘law of large
numbers’ and implies that the long-time averages we will need
to calculate can, in fact, be closely approximated by averages
across the probability spaces of those sources. This is no small
matter.
Note that our treatment does not preclude the existence of
cognitive processes or submodules which may not have appro-
priate dual information sources. We cannot, however, fit them
easily into our development, although Wallace (2003) has be-
gun to explore extension of the theory to a certain class of
non-ergodic information sources.
IV. Interacting information sources: ‘sociocultural
psychoneuroimmunology’
We suppose that the behavior of a cognitive subsystem can
be represented by a sequence of ‘states’ in time, the ‘path’
x ≡ x0, x1, .... Similarly, we assume an external signal of
‘structured psychosocial stress’ can also be represented by
a path y ≡ y0, y1, .... These paths are, however, both very
highly structured and, within themselves, are serially corre-
lated and can, in fact, be represented by ‘information sources’
X and Y. We assume the cognitive process and external
stressors interact, so that these sequences of states are not in-
dependent, but are jointly serially correlated. We can, then,
define a path of sequential pairs as z ≡ (x0, y0), (x1, y1), ....
The essential content of the Joint Asymptotic Equiparti-
tion Theorem is that the set of joint paths z can be parti-
tioned into a relatively small set of high probability which
is termed jointly typical, and a much larger set of vanishingly
small probability. Further, according to the JAEPT, the split-
ting criterion between high and low probability sets of pairs
is the mutual information
I(X,Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(X,Y )
(3)
where H(X),H(Y ),H(X|Y ) and H(X,Y ) are, respec-
tively, the Shannon uncertainties of X and Y , their condi-
tional uncertainty, and their joint uncertainty. See Cover and
Thomas (1991) or Ash (1990) for mathematical details. As
stated above, the Shannon-McMillan Theorem and its vari-
ants permit expression of the various uncertainties in terms
of cross sectional sums of terms of the form −Pk log[Pk]
where the Pk are appropriate direct or conditional probabili-
ties. Similar approaches to neural process have been recently
adopted by Dimitrov and Miller (2001).
The high probability pairs of paths are, in this formulation,
all equiprobable, and if N(n) is the number of jointly typical
pairs of length n, then, according to the Shannon-McMillan
Theorem and its ‘joint’ variants,
I(X,Y ) = lim
n→∞
log[N(n)]
n
.
(4)
Generalizing the earlier language-on-a-network models of
Wallace and Wallace (1998, 1999), we suppose there is a ‘cou-
pling parameter’ P representing the degree of linkage between
the cognitive system of interest and the structured ‘language’
of external signals and stressors, and set K = 1/P , following
the development of those earlier studies. Then we have
I[K] = lim
n→∞
log[N(K,n)]
n
.
The essential ‘homology’ between information theory and
statistical mechanics lies in the similarity of this expression
with the infinite volume limit of the free energy density. If
Z(K) is the statistical mechanics partition function derived
from the system’s Hamiltonian, then the free energy density
is determined by the relation
F [K] = lim
V→∞
log[Z(K)]
V
.
(5)
F is the free energy density, V the system volume and K =
1/T , where T is the system temperature.
We and others argue at some length (e.g. Wallace and
Wallace, 1998, 1999; Wallace, 2000; Rojdestvensky and Cot-
tam, 2000; Feynman, 1996) that this is indeed a systematic
mathematical homology which, we contend, permits impor-
tation of renormalization symmetry into information theory.
Imposition of invariance under renormalization on the mutual
information splitting criterion I(X,Y ) implies the existence
of phase transitions analogous to learning plateaus or punc-
tuated evolutionary equilibria in the relations between cog-
nitive mechanism and external perturbation. An extensive
mathematical treatment of these ideas is presented elsewhere
(Wallace, 2002b, Wallace et al., 2003).
Elaborate developments are possible. From a the more lim-
ited perspective of the Rate Distortion Theorem, a selective
corollary of the Shannon-McMillan Theorem, we can view the
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onset of a punctuated interaction between the cognitive mech-
anism and external stressors as the literal writing of distorted
image of those stressors upon cognition:
Suppose that two (piecewise, adiabatically memoryless) er-
godic information sources Y and B begin to interact, to ‘talk’
to each other, i.e. to influence each other in some way so
that it is possible, for example, to look at the output of B –
strings b – and infer something about the behavior of Y from
it – strings y. We suppose it possible to define a retranslation
from the B-language into the Y-language through a determin-
istic code book, and call Yˆ the translated information source,
as mirrored by B.
Define some distortion measure comparing paths y to paths
yˆ, d(y, yˆ) (Cover and Thomas, 1991). We invoke the Rate Dis-
tortion Theorem’s mutual information I(Y, Yˆ ), which is the
splitting criterion between high and low probability pairs of
paths. Impose, now, a parametization by an inverse coupling
strengthK, and a renormalization symmetry representing the
global structure of the system coupling.
Extending the analyses, triplets of sequences, Y1, Y2, Z, for
which one in particular, here Z, is the ‘embedding context’
affecting the other two, can also be divided by a splitting
criterion into two sets, having high and low probabilities re-
spectively. The probability of a particular triplet of sequences
is then determined by the conditional probabilities
P (Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2, Z = z) = Πnj=1p(y
1
j |zj)p(y2j |zj)p(zj).
(6)
That is, Y1 and Y2 are, in some measure, driven by their
interaction with Z.
For large n the number of triplet sequences in the high
probability set will be determined by the relation (Cover and
Thomas, 1992, p. 387)
N(n) ∝ exp[nI(Y1;Y2|Z)],
(7)
where splitting criterion is given by
I(Y1;Y2|Z) ≡
H(Z) +H(Y1|Z) +H(Y2|Z)−H(Y1, Y2, Z).
We can then examine mixed cognitive/adaptive phase tran-
sitions analogous to learning plateaus (Wallace, 2002b) in the
splitting criterion I(Y1, Y2|Z). Note that our results are al-
most exactly parallel to the Eldredge/Gould model of evo-
lutionary punctuated equilibrium (Eldredge, 1985; Gould,
2002).
We can, for the purposes of this work, extend this model to
any number of interacting information sources, Y1, Y2, ..., Ys
conditional on an external context Z in terms of a splitting
criterion defined by
I(Y1; ...;Ys|Z) = H(Z) +
s∑
j=1
H(Yj |Z)−H(Y1, ..., Ys, Z),
(8)
where the conditional Shannon uncertainties H(Yj |Z) are
determined by the appropriate direct and conditional proba-
bilities.
V. The simplest model of cognition and stress
Stress, as we envision it, is not a random sequence of pertur-
bations, and is not independent of its perception. Rather, it
involves a highly correlated, grammatical, syntactical process
by which an embedding psychosocial environment communi-
cates with an individual, particularly with that individual’s
multiple cognitive modules, typically in the context of social
hierarchy. We first view the structured stress experienced by
an individual as APME information source, interacting with
a similar dual information source defined by some cognitive
submodule or, more typically, a more complicated ‘splitting
criterion’ defined by the interaction of several such modules.
Again, the ergodic nature of the ‘language’ of stress is
essentially a generalization of the law of large numbers, so
that long-time averages can be well approximated by cross-
sectional expectations. Languages do not have simple auto-
correlation patterns, in distinct contrast with the usual as-
sumption of random perturbations by ‘white noise’ in the
standard formulation of stochastic differential equations.
Let us suppose we cannot measure either stress or cognitive
submodule function directly, but can determine the concen-
trations of hormones, neurotransmitters, certain cytokines,
and other biomarkers, or else macroscopic behaviors, beliefs,
feelings, and other responses associated with the function of
cognitive submodules according to some ‘natural’ time frame
inherent to the system. This would typically be the circadian
cycle in both men and women, and the hormonal cycle in
premenopausal women. Suppose, in the absence of extraor-
dinary ‘meaningful’ psychosocial stress, we measure a series
of n biomarker concentrations, behavioral characteristics, and
other indices at time t which we represent as an n-dimensional
vector Xt. Suppose we conduct a number of experiments, and
create a regression model so that we can, in the absence of
perturbation, write, to first order, the markers at time t + 1
in terms of that at time t using a matrix equation of the form
Xt+1 ≈ RXt + b0,
(9)
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where R is the matrix of regression coefficients and b0 a
(possibly zero) vector of constant terms.
We then suppose that, in the presence of a perturbation by
structured stress
Xt+1 = (R+ δRt+1)Xt + b0
≡ RXt + t+1,
(10)
where we have absorbed both b0 and δRt+1Xt into a vector
t+1 of ‘error’ terms which are not necessarily small in this for-
mulation. In addition it is important to realize that this is not
a population process whose continuous analog is exponential
growth. Rather what we examine is more akin to the pas-
sage of a signal – structured psychosocial stress – through a
distorting physiological, psychological, or sociocultural filter.
If the matrix of regression coefficients R is sufficiently reg-
ular, we can (Jordan block) diagonalize it using the matrix of
its column eigenvectors Q, writing
QXt+1 = (QRQ−1)QXt +Qt+1,
(11)
or equivalently as
Yt+1 = JYt +Wt+1,
(12)
where Yt ≡ QXt,Wt+1 ≡ Qt+1, and J ≡ QRQ−1 is a
(block) diagonal matrix in terms of the eigenvalues of R.
Thus the (rate distorted) writing of structured stress onto
cognitive response through δRt+1 is reexpressed in terms of
the vector Wt+1.
It is important to note that, in general, the eigenvectors of
R are not orthogonal, suggesting the possibility that excita-
tion of a single eigenvector will result in ‘overtones’ of ‘mixed
cognitive responses’ in our model. We will return to the im-
portance of nonorthogonality below.
The sequence of Wt+1 is the rate-distorted image of the in-
formation source defined by the system of external structured
psychosocial stress. This formulation permits estimation of
the long-term steady-state effects of that image on emotional
state. The essential trick is to recognize that because every-
thing is (APM) ergodic, we can either time or ensemble aver-
age both sides of equation (12), so that the one-period offset
is absorbed in the averaging, giving an ‘equilibrium’ relation
< Y >= J < Y > + < W >
or
< Y >= (I− J)−1 < W >,
(13)
where I is the n× n identity matrix.
Now we reverse the argument: Suppose that Yk is chosen
to be some fixed eigenvector of R. Using the diagonalization
of J in terms of its eigenvalues, we obtain the average ‘cogni-
tive excitation’ in terms of some eigentransformed pattern of
exciting perturbations as
< Yk >=
1
1− λk < Wk >
(14)
where λk is the eigenvalue of < Yk >, and < Wk > is
some appropriately transformed set of ongoing perturbations
by structured psychosocial stress.
The essence of this result is that there will be a characteris-
tic form of perturbation by structured psychosocial stress – the
Wk – which will resonantly excite a particular ‘mixed cogni-
tive eigenmode’. Conversely, by ‘tuning’ the eigenmodes ofR,
output can be trained to galvanized response in the presence
of particular forms of long-lasting perturbation.
This is because, if R has been appropriately determined
from regression relations, then the λk will be a kind of multiple
correlation coefficient (e.g. Wallace and Wallace, 2000), so
that particular eigenpatterns of perturbation will have greatly
amplified impact. If λ = 0 then perturbation has no more
effect than its own magnitude. If, however, λ → 1, then the
written image of a perturbing psychosocial stressor will have
very great effect. Following Ives (1995), we call a system
with λ ≈ 0 resilient since its response is no greater than the
perturbation itself.
In this model learning is, most obviously, the process of
tuning response to perturbation. That is, we envision the
regression matrix R as itself a tunable set of variables.
Suppose we require that λ itself be a function of the mag-
nitude of excitation, i.e.
λ = f(| < W > |)
where | < W > | is the vector length of < W >. We can,
for example, require the amplification factor 1/(1−λ) to have
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a signal transduction form, an inverted-U-shaped curve, for
example the signal-to-noise ratio of a stochastic resonance, so
that
1
1− λ =
1/| < W > |2
1 + b exp[1/(2| < W > |)] .
(15)
This places particular constraints on the behavior of R,
and gives a pattern of initial generalized hypersensitization,
followed by anergy or ‘burnout’ with increasing average stress,
a behavior that might well be characterized as ‘pathological
resilience’, and may have multifactorial evolutionary signifi-
cance: induced ‘burnout’ may become a viable game-theoretic
or other strategy for particular forms of inescapable stress
(e.g. Mealey, 1995).
VI. The generalized cognitive homunculus and its
retina: responding to sudden change
Cohen (2000) argues at some length for the existence of an
‘immunological homunculus’, i.e. the immune system’s own
perception of the body as a whole. The particular utility
of such a homunculus, in his view, is that sensing perturba-
tions in such a self-image can serve as an early warning sign
of pending necessary inflammatory response – expressions of
tumorigenesis, acute or chronic infection, parasitization, and
the like. Thayer and Lane (2000) argue something analogous
for emotional response as a quick internal index of larger pat-
terns of threat or opportunity.
It seems obvious that the collection of interacting cognitive
submodules we have explored above must also have a coherent
internal self-image of the state of the mind-and-body and its
social relationships. This inferred picture, at the individual
level, we term the ‘generalized cognitive homunculus’, (GCH).
Suppose we write a GCH response to short-term perturba-
tion – not the effects of long-lasting structured psychosocial
stress – as
Xt+1 = (R0 + δRt+1)Xt.
Again we impose a (Jordan block) diagonalization in terms
of the matrix of (generally nonorthogonal) eigenvectors Q0
of some ‘zero reference state’ R0, obtaining, for an initial
condition which is an eigenvector Yt ≡ Yk of R0,
Yt+1 = (J0 + δJt+1)Yk = λkYk + δYt+1 =
λkYk +
n∑
j=1
ajYj ,
(16)
where J0 is a (block) diagonal matrix as above, δJt+1 ≡
Q0δRt+1Q−10 , and δYt+1 has been expanded in terms of a
spectrum of the eigenvectors of R0, with
|aj |  |λk|, |aj+1|  |aj |.
(17)
The essential point is that, provided R0 has been properly
‘tuned’, so that this condition is true, the first few terms in
the spectrum of the plieotropic iteration of the eigenstate will
contain almost all of the essential information about the per-
turbation, i.e. most of the variance. We envision this as simi-
lar to the detection of color in the optical retina, where three
overlapping non-orthogonal ‘eigenmodes’ of response suffice
to characterize a vast array of color sensations. Here, if a
concise spectral expansion is possible, a very small number of
(typically nonorthogonal) ‘generalized cognitive eigenmodes’
permit characterization of a vast range of external perturba-
tions, and rate distortion constraints become very manageable
indeed. Thus GCH responses – the spectrum of excited eigen-
modes of R0, provided it is properly tuned – can be a very
accurate and precise gauge of environmental perturbation.
The choice of zero reference state R0, i.e. the ‘base state’
from which perturbations are measured, is, we claim, a highly
nontrivial task, necessitating a specialized apparatus.
This is a critical point. According to current theory, the
adapted human mind functions through the action and inter-
action of distinct mental modules which evolved fairly rapidly
to help address special problems of environmental and so-
cial selection pressure faced by our Pleistocene ancestors (e.g.
Barkow et al., 1992). Here we have postulated the neces-
sity of other physiological and social cognitive modules. As is
well known in computer engineering, calculation by special-
ized submodules – e.g. numeric processor chips – can be a far
more efficient means of solving particular well-defined classes
of problems than direct computation by a generalized system.
We suggest, then, that our generalized cognition has evolved
specialized submodules to speed the address of certain com-
monly recurring challenges.
We argue that identification of the ‘normal’ state of the
GCH – generalized cognition’s self-image of the body and its
social relationships – is a difficult matter requiring a dedi-
cated cognitive submodule within overall generalized cogni-
tion. This is essentially because, for the vast majority of
information systems, unlike mechanical systems, there are no
‘restoring springs’ whose low energy state automatically iden-
tifies equilibrium: relatively speaking, all states of the GCH
are ‘high energy’ states. That is, active comparison must be
made of the state of the GCH with some stored internal ref-
erence picture, and a decision made about whether to reset to
zero, which is a cognitive process. We further speculate that
the complexity of such a submodule must also follow some-
thing like Nunney’s power law with animal size, as the overall
generalized cognition and its image of the self, become in-
creasingly complicated with rising number of cells and levels
of linked cognition.
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Failure of that cognitive submodule results in identification
of a usually transient activated state of the GCH as ‘nor-
mal’, triggering the collective patterns of systemic activation
(possibly including persistent underactivation) which consti-
tute certain comorbid mental and chronic physical disorders.
This would result in a relatively small number of characteris-
tic ‘eigenforms’ of comorbidity, which would typically become
more mixed with increasing disorder.
In sum, since such ‘zero mode identification’ (ZMI) is a
(presumed) cognitive submodule of overall generalized cogni-
tion, it involves convoluting incoming ‘sensory’ with ‘ongoing’
internal memory data in choosing the zero state, i.e. defining
R0. The dual information source defined by this cognitive
process can then interact in a punctuated manner with ‘ex-
ternal information sources’ according to the Rate Distortion
and related arguments above. From a RDT perspective, then,
those external information sources literally write a distorted
image of themselves onto the ZMI, often in a punctuated man-
ner: (relatively) sudden onset of a developmental trajectory
to comorbid mental disorders and chronic physical disease.
Different systems of external signals – including but not
limited to structured psychosocial stress – will, presumably,
write different characteristic images of themselves onto the
ZMI cognitive submodule, i.e. trigger different patterns of
comorbid mental disorder and chronic diseases.
Elsewhere (R. Wallace, 2003) we speculate that patterns
of autoimmune disease are likely to be related to both circa-
dian and hormonal cycles, factors which may come into play
in comorbidity of more general mental and chronic physical
disorder.
Further theoretical development would introduce the ‘gen-
eralized Onsager relation’ analysis of gradient effects in driv-
ing parameters which affects system behavior between phase
transitions (e.g. Wallace, 2002a). All these extensions remain
to be done, and are not trivial.
VII. Discussion and conclusions
1. Generalized autocognitive disorder as a devel-
opmental disease To reiterate, if Y represents the informa-
tion source dual to ‘zero mode identification’ in generalized
cognition, and if Z is the information source characterizing
structured psychosocial stress, which serves as an embedding
context, the ‘mutual information’ between them
I(Y ;Z) = H(Y )−H(Y |Z)
(18)
serves as a splitting criterion for pairs of linked paths of
states.
We suppose it possible to parametize the coupling between
these interacting information sources by some ‘inverse tem-
perature’, K, writing
I(Y ;Z) = I[K],
(19)
with structured psychosocial stress as the embedding con-
text.
Invocation of the mathematical homology between equa-
tions (4) and (5) permits imposition of renormalization for-
malism (Wallace, 2000; Wallace et al., 2003a) resulting in
punctuated phase transition depending on K.
Socioculturally constructed and structured psychosocial
stress, in this model having both ‘grammar’ and ‘syntax’, can
be viewed as entraining the function of zero mode identifica-
tion when the coupling with stress exceeds a threshold. More
than one threshold appears likely, accounting in a sense for
the often staged nature of ‘environmentally caused’ disorders.
These should result in a series of collective, but highly system-
atic, ‘tuning failures’ which, in the Rate Distortion sense, rep-
resents a literal image of the structure of imposed psychosocial
stress written upon the ability of the GCH to characterize a
‘normal’ mode of excitation, causing a mixed atypical and
usually transient state to become permanent, producing co-
morbid mental and chronic physical disorder. As discussed
above, this process may have both cross-sectional and longi-
tudinal structure, with the latter accounting for ‘critical pe-
riods’ in the onset of developmental disorders.
Coronary heart disease (CHD) is already understood as
a disease of development, which begins in utero. Work by
Barker and colleagues, which we cited above, suggests that
those who develop CHD grow differently from others, both in
utero and during childhood. Slow growth during fetal life and
infancy is followed by accelerated weight gain in childhood,
setting a life history trajectory for CHD, type II diabetes, hy-
pertension, and, of course, obesity. Barker (2002) concludes
that slow fetal growth might also heighten the body’s stress
responses and increase vulnerability to poor living conditions
later in life. Thus, in his view, CHD is a developmental dis-
order that originates through two widespread biological phe-
nomena, developmental plasticity and compensatory growth,
a conclusion consistent with the work of Smith et al. (1998),
who found that deprivation in childhood influences risk of
mortality from CHD in adulthood, although an additive in-
fluence of adult circumstances is seen in such cases.
Much of the CHD work particularly implicates certain kinds
of hypertension as a developmental disorder. As Eriksson et
al. (2000) put the matter,
“The association between low birth weight and
raised blood pressure in later life has now been re-
ported in more than 50 published studies of men,
women, and children. It has been shown to result
from retarded fetal growth rather than premature
birth. The ‘fetal origins’ hypothesis proposes that
the association reflects permanent resetting of blood
pressure by undernutrition in utero.”
With regard to asthma, Wright et al. (1998) find prospec-
tive epidemiological studies showing that the newborn period
11
is dominated by Th2 reactivity in response to allergens, and
it is also evident that Th1 memory cells selectively develop
shortly after birth, and persist into adulthood in non-atopic
subjects. For most children who become allergic or asthmatic,
the polarization of their immune systems into an atopic phe-
notype probably occurs during early childhood. There is ev-
idence that parental reports of life stress are associated with
subsequent onset of wheezing in children between birth and
one year. It has been speculated that stress triggers hormones
in the early months of life which may influence Th2 cell pre-
dominance, perhaps through a direct influence of stress hor-
mones on the production of cytokines that are thought to
modulate the direction of immune cell differentiation.
Work by Hirsch (2003) can be interpreted as suggesting
that obesity, which is also seriously epidemic in the USA, is a
developmental disorder with roots in utero or early childhood.
Hirsch and others have developed a ‘set point’ or homeostatic
theory of body weight, finding that it is the process which
determines that ‘set point’ which needs examination, rather
than the homeostasis itself, which is now fairly well under-
stood. Hirsch concludes that the truly relevant question is
not why obese people fail treatment, it is how their level of
fat storage became elevated, a matter, he concludes, is prob-
ably rooted in infancy and childhood, when strong genetic
determinants are shaping a still-plastic organism.
Somewhat less conclusively, a lively debate rages regarding
various possible subforms of psychopathy, a mental disorder
characterized by a long history manipulative, impulsive, and
callous antisocial ‘cheating’ behavior. Mealy (1995) places the
disorder in an evolutionary perspective as either a genetically
determined or an acquired ‘life history strategy’ very simi-
lar to Nunney’s (1999) analysis of cancer, albeit at the social
rather than cellular level of interaction. Paris (1993) attempts
to provide a comprehensive, integrative, biopsychosocial per-
turbed ‘condition-development’ model for personality disor-
ders, while Lalumiere et al. (2001), by contrast, find evidence
for a strict life-history strategy model, concluding, as a result
of studies on children and adolescents, that “If psychopathy is
a result of condition-development, the environmental triggers
are likely to operate very early”. The review by Herpertz et al.
(2000) examines the hypothesis that pathologically neglectful
parenting and early social rejection contribute to onset of the
disorder, particularly in the context of ‘individualistic’ social
structures (e.g. Cooke, 1996). We speculate that it is possible
to place the ‘social cheating’ of psychopathy in the same con-
text as Nunney’s cellular cheating for cancer, consequently
being subject to the standard pattern of gene-environment
‘norms of reaction’ which will emerge as structured psychoso-
cial stress has impact over the course of child development,
probably beginning in utero.
It almost goes without saying that the diagnosis of psy-
chopathy (like other ‘personality disorders’) is very much con-
centrated in prison subpopulations, and these have marked
ethnic and ‘racial’ structure.
Anxiety disorders have along history of attribution to de-
velopmental factors and early childhood exposures (e.g. Ban-
delow et al., 2002). More generally, Egle et al. (2002) find
evidence that early biological and psychosocial stress in child-
hood is associated with long-term vulnerability to various
mental and physical diseases. Research findings have, in their
view, accumulated on those emotional, behavioral and psy-
chobiological factors which are responsible for the mediation
of lifelong consequences including increased risk of somatiza-
tion and other mental disorders such as anxiety, depression
and personality disorders. These often result in high-risk be-
haviors that are associated with physical disease – cardiovas-
cular disorders, stroke, viral hepatitis, type 2 diabetes, chronic
lung disease, as well as with aggressive behavior.
We are led to suggest that these case histories represent
a far more general phenomenon in the etiology of the larger
spectrum of chronic and comorbid mental and physical dis-
orders, in the sense that structured psychosocial stress can
literally write an image of itself upon the developing child,
and if acute enough, on the adult, initiating trajectories to
comorbid mental and chronic physical disorder.
2. Schizophrenia: The spectrum of co- and an-
ticomorbidities Schizophrenia, although it does not seem
to display as marked a ‘health disparities’ pattern as the
other disorders which are the central focus of this work,
appears nonetheless to fall broadly within the paradigm of
a developmental cognitive disorder (e.g. Lewis and Levitt,
2002; Allin and Murray, 2002). Within the United King-
dom schizophrenia is, however, significantly more prevalent
among Afro-Caribbean immigrants subject to chronic unem-
ployment, early separation from parents, and perhaps racial
discrimination, when compared with non-migrants of either
majority or minority ethnicity (Mallett et al., 2002). For the
U.S. there is some controversy as to the propensity of major-
ity clinicians to overdiagnose schizophrenia among minority
patients, perhaps masking underlying demographic patterns.
As Gaughran et al. (2002) note, however, there is good evi-
dence of immune activation in schizophrenia. Up to a third
of patients has an autoimmune condition clinically unrelated
to their psychiatric illness, and first degree relatives of people
with schizophrenia also have increased incidence of autoim-
mune disease.
Torrey and Yolken (2001) note the similarities and con-
trasts between schizophrenia and rheumatoid arthritis. Both
are chronic, persistent diseases displaying lifelong prevalence
and a relapsing and remitting course. Both are felt to involve
environmental insults occurring in genetically susceptible in-
dividuals, and their diagnosis depends upon syndromal diag-
nostic criteria which have been developed by committees and
have changed over time. Many studies, however, have ob-
served a striking inverse correlation – an ‘anticomorbidity’ –
between the two diseases, although both are believed to run in
families, with a population prevalence of about one percent.
That is, people with schizophrenia seem less likely to suffer
from rheumatoid arthritis, although perhaps more likely to
suffer autoimmune disease in general.
This begins to resemble the ‘eigenmode’ patterns discussed
above.
Grossman et al. (2003) describe how the recent emphasis
on schizophrenia as a developmental disorder has focused on
characterizing the role of non-genetic factors in the develop-
ment of symptom patterns. Certain prenatal and perinatal
environmental exposures, including maternal stress and mal-
nourishment, and obstetric complications such as low birth
weight, have been reported to be associated with increased
susceptibility to the disorder. Increased incidence has also
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been reported in children born to mothers who experienced
infection from influenza or rubella during the second trimester
of pregnancy. Thus early neurodevelopmental processes may
be compromised, laying groundwork for disorder when taxed
by later developmental demands, for example those associated
with the stressful periods of social development in childhood
and adolescence.
Rothermundt et al. (2001) further summarize at some
length the case for both the infection and autoimmune hy-
potheses regarding onset of schizophrenia.
Torrey and Yolken (2001) conclude that the negative asso-
ciation between schizophrenia and rheumatoid arthritis may
depend on the timing of some critical exposure, e.g. that ex-
posure in utero or childhood produces schizophrenia, while ex-
posure in adulthood produces rheumatoid arthritis. A slightly
different hypothesis, consistent with the mathematical exer-
cises above, is that rheumatoid arthritis and schizophrenia
characterize different atypical mixed eigenmodes falsely and
recurrently identified as zero states by the progressive fail-
ure of the ZMI module discussed above. Such would tend to
be mutually exclusive, although not absolutely so since the
eigenmodes are not orthogonal.
A broadly similar pattern has been commented on by Karls-
son et al. (2001), who found homologous sequences of the
HERV-W family of endogenous retroviruses in the cerebro-
spinal fluid of newly-diagnosed individuals with schizophre-
nia and in other subjects having multiple sclerosis. Karlsson
et al. (2001) speculate it is possible that individuals with
schizophrenia and multiple sclerosis undergo the activation of
similar retroviral sequences but differ in terms of genetically
determined responses to the retroviral activation. Schizophre-
nia and multiple sclerosis are distinct clinical entities and have
different pathological manifestations, gender ratios, and clin-
ical courses, but share a number of epidemiological features
including age of onset, seasons of birth, and geographic distri-
butions. In addition, however, some patients display clinical
manifestations of both diseases.
Similarly, rigorous studies by Dupont et al. (1986), Gulbi-
nat et al. (1992) and Mortinsen (1989, 1994), which followed
large Danish and Dutch cohorts of patients with schizophre-
nia, when adjusted for smoking patterns, showed marked and
highly significant reduction in a broad variety of cancers.
More recent work by Cohen et al. (2002) adjusted for age,
race, gender, marital status, education, net worth, smoking,
and hospitalization in the year before death, for a large US
sample likewise found markedly reduced risk of cancer among
persons diagnosed with schizophrenia. Catts and Catts (2000)
speculate that such results are driven by hyperactivation of
the p53 tumor suppressor/apoptosis gene during neurodevel-
opment, causing long-term developmental dysfunction, while
Teunis et al. (2002) suggest, from animal model studies,
that the hyperreactive dopaminergic system characteristic of
schizophrenia inhibits tumor vascularization.
These examples, again, strongly suggest the ‘nonorthogonal
eigenmode’ pattern of the mathematical model, in which the
ZMI module, including both immune function and the larger
system of tumor control mechanisms within a unified and
broadly cognitive structure, fails in a systematic epigenetic
manner, producing characteristic spectra of co- and antico-
morbidities among different dysfunctions.
We are led to speculate that, at the population level, struc-
tured psychosocial stress will exert a ‘higher order effect’,
producing different spectra of co- and antico- morbidities be-
tween schizophrenia and other disorders within powerful and
marginalized subgroups. This prediction should be empiri-
cally testable.
3. Zero mode identification as a general problem
for ‘languages of thought’ For those dubious of Gener-
alized Cognitive Homunculus regression model arguments, a
brief reformulation in terms of the abstract development of
section III above may be of interest. Recall that the essential
characteristic of cognition in our formalism involves a func-
tion h which maps a (convolutional) path x = a0, a1, ..., an, ...
onto a member of one of two disjoint sets, B0 or B1. Thus re-
spectively, either (1) h(x) ∈ B0, implying no action taken, or
(2), h(x) ∈ B1, and some particular response is chosen from
a large repertoire of possible responses. We discussed briefly
the problem of defining these two disjoint sets, and suggested
that some ‘higher order cognitive module’ might be needed
to identify what constituted B0, the set of ‘normal’ states.
Again, this is because there is no low energy mode for in-
formation systems: virtually all states are more or less high
energy states, and there is no way to identify a ground state
using the physicist’s favorite variational or other minimization
arguments on energy.
Suppose that higher order cognitive module, which we now
recognize as a kind of Zero Mode Identification, interacts with
an embedding language of structured psychosocial stress (or
other systemic perturbation) and, instantiating a Rate Distor-
tion image of that embedding stress, begins to include one or
more members of the set B1 into the set B0. Recurrent ‘hits’
on that aberrant state would be experienced as episodes of
highly structured comorbid mind/body pathology.
Empirical tests of this hypothesis, however, quickly lead
again into real-world regression models involving the interre-
lations of measurable biomarkers, beliefs, behaviors, reported
feelings, and so on, requiring formalism much like that used
in sections V and VI.
4. Cautions and implications Much of our reasoning
has been based on a fairly elaborate mathematical model of
cognitive process. Mathematical models of physiological, so-
cial, and other ecosystems – like those we present here – are
notorious for their unreliability, instability, and oversimplifi-
cation. As it is said, “all models are wrong, but some models
are useful”. The mathematical ecologist E.C. Pielou (1977,
p. 106) finds the usefulness of models consists not in answer-
ing questions but in raising them, i.e. models can be used to
inspire new field investigations and these are the only source
of new knowledge as opposed to new speculation.
The speculations arising from our analysis are of some in-
terest. In particular our speculation that a pattern of co- and
antico- morbid mental and chronic physical disorder repre-
sents a pathological, ordinarily atypical or transient, state is
consistent with theorizing in both autoimmune disease and
mental disorder. Gilbert (2001), for example, uses an evolu-
tionary approach to conclude that the relatively small num-
ber of evolved adaptive defense mechanisms, for example
the flight-or-fight hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis,
may become pathologically activated to produce mental dis-
order. He suggests that such evolved defenses, of which there
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is a limited number, can become pathological when they are
too easily aroused or prolonged, are arrested (i.e. aroused but
not expressed), or are ineffective. These might involve depres-
sion, anxious arousal, or heightened vigilance to threat, with
the type of defense (e.g. flight, fight, submit, help seeking)
being mirrored in particular symptom presentations.
Jones and Blackshaw (2000) likewise argue that behavioral
similarities between humans and animals show that many psy-
chiatric states are distortions of evolved behavior, a perspec-
tive which provides, in their view, a new etiological approach
to psychiatry transcending current mainstream empirical and
phenomenological approaches which are principally forms of
symptom classification.
Although individual pathologies of both mind and body
may predominate in particular cases, our work here attempts
to encompass a broad spectrum of chronic diseases, emotional
disorders, and classic cognitive dysfunction, in the context of
the local sociocultural network so important in human biol-
ogy, and to explore the particular effects of structured psy-
chosocial stress in the development of comorbid mind/body
symptom patterns over the life course.
To reiterate, comorbidity may well be to medicine what
the ‘dirty open secret’ of punctuation in the fossil record is to
evolutionary theory (e.g. Gould, 2002).
The model which emerged focuses on the ‘eigenstructure’ of
a generalized cognitive homunculus, and particularly on fail-
ure of a higher cognitive module which permits identification
of the ‘zero mode’ of such a homunculus. For certain classes
of mind/body symptomatology, early experiences of exposure
to structured psychosocial stress can trigger identification of
a morbid, highly atypical, mode as the zero-reference state,
and initiate a life course of co- or antico- morbid psychiatric
and physical disorders. The most typical pattern we have
in mind would involve individual and population-level comor-
bidity among obesity, asthma, diabetes, hypertension, depres-
sion, anxiety, substance abuse, ruthless or violent behaviors,
coronary heart disease, certain cancers, and asthma or lupus
– what might well be characterized as ‘oppression disorder’ at
the individual level.
Our analysis suggests that historical patterns of discrimi-
nation, deprivation, and injustice – for example the evolved
system of slavery which has been characterized as ‘Ameri-
can Apartheid’ – are a determining feature in population-level
expression of comorbid psychiatric and chronic physical dis-
order, patterns which are literally an image of that system
imposed upon children, beginning in their mothers’ wombs.
The more dubious aspects of the history of the United
States are alive and well and being rewritten daily upon the
developing bodies of its children.
This being said, the works of Albert Memmi (e.g. 1969) and
Franz Fanon (e.g. 1966) show clearly that, for Apartheid sys-
tems, the reflective nature of structured psychosocial stress
ensures that the health and welfare of both dominant and
dominated populations will be closely linked through a wide
variety of mechanisms. Within the United States this dy-
namic is clearly demonstrated by the relation between the
obesity ‘epidemics’ within ‘Black’ and ‘White’ populations.
Figure 1 shows the national Black death rate from diabetes
(per 100,000) as a function of the White rate over the pe-
riod 1979 to 1997. Both are rising rapidly, and, while that
for Blacks is typically 1.5 times that for Whites, the increases
are nonetheless very highly correlated indeed: R2 = 0.99.
The ‘obesity epidemic’ in the US, then, appears to be a
single system which enmeshes both populations, suggesting
more generally that the health of those at the bottom of a
draconian social hierarchy is often a leading indicator for the
health of all, and that the health of those at the top appears
seriously limited by the very structures which impose or ex-
acerbate hierarchy. In this regard, figure 2 shows the rapidly
increasing percent of total US income accounted for by the
highest five percent of the population as a function of the in-
tegral of the number of manufacturing jobs lost in the US since
1980. The latter is an index of permanently dispersed social,
economic, and political capital for large sectors of the pop-
ulation. The inference, of course, is that deindustrialization
and its associated phenomena have exacerbated a pathogenic
social hierarchy enmeshing both dominant and subordinate
populations into trajectories of developmental disorder. Ab-
sent large-scale social and economic reform, this process will
certainly continue.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1 US Black vs. White diabetes death rates (per
100,000), 1979-1997. While the Black rates are uniformly
higher than the White, the coupling between them is very
strong indeed, suggesting that, in the words of one researcher,
“concentration is not containment” for chronic as well as for
infectious diseases like AIDS or tuberculosis.
Figure 2 Percent of total US income accounted for by the
highest five percent of the population vs. integral of manu-
facturing job loss since 1980, 1980-1998.
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